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SIMULATION AND WRITTEN EXAM
IAN WEINSTEIN*
Written examinations play a key role in legal education. The
LSAT is the most important factor in law school admissions. Once
students enroll in law school, exams are used to evaluate and sort first
year students. At most American law schools, a single, end of semes-
ter or end of year, timed, written, in class exam determines the grade
in each first year class.' Although exams continue to play a major role
throughout law school, once students are sorted at the end of first year
it is often difficult for them to significantly change their place in the
law school hierarchy. This paper argues that written exams are not
adequate assessment tools for law schools and presents data sug-
gesting that using both graded simulations and exams would better
assess and promote the development of law students into lawyers.
Legal academia's reliance on written exams raises questions at all
stages of the process, from student selection through graduation. Al-
though the LSAT is a valid statistical predictor, 2 it has serious limita-
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I want to thank
Prof. Barry Rosenfeld, Associate Professor of Psychology, Fordham University. Prof. Ro-
senfeld performed the statistical analysis and gave me very helpful advice, but responsibil-
ity for the project, and its shortcomings, is mine. I also want to thank my colleagues,
Professors Elizabeth Cooper and James Cohen for their comments, and Assistant Dean of
Admissions Kevin Downey for his many thoughtful observations about student assessment.
Fordham University provided financial support for this project.
I A very useful collection of much of the empirical research on legal education in-
cludes a review of studies that show written exams are the most common method of law
student evaluation. James R. P. Ogloff, David R. Lyon, Kevin S. Douglas, V. Gordon
Rose, Annual Nebraska Survey & Survey of Legal Education: More than "Learning to
Think like a Lawyer:" the Empirical Research on Legal Education 34 CREIGI-TON L. REV.
73 (2000) (citing Nancy H. Kaufman, A Survey of Law School Grading Practices, 44 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 415 (1994) & Steve H. Nickles, Examining and Grading in American Law
Schools, 30 ARK. L. REV. 411, 411-12 (1977)(finding that letter grading based on a single
examination is the predominant evaluation method for traditional law school courses)).
See generally Phillip C. Kissam, Law School Examinations 42 VAND. L. REV. 433 (1989)
(describing and defending written examinations and suggesting some reforms).
2 The LSAT reliably predicts first year grades. For the group as a whole, test takers
who do better on the test will also tend to receive higher first year law school grades. The
magnitude of their relative success on the LSAT will also tend to predict the magnitude of
their relative success as measured by first year grades. Lisa C. Anthony, Vincent F. Harris,
& Peter J. Pashley, Predictive Validity of the LSAT: A National Summary of the 1995-1996
Correlation Studies, Law School Admissions Council LSAT Technical Report 97-01, Law
School Admissions Report Series (1999)(finding the LSAT has a mean correlation coeffi-
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tions. The test can only predict a portion of the variation in grades.3
Like any statistical tool, its predictions are most powerful for the large
group. The test offers progressively less information about smaller
subgroups and is not equally valid for all subgroups. It tends to over-
predict the success of white males and underpredict the performances
of women and people of color. 4 As with any predictive examination,
its use must be informed by a good understanding of what it can and
cannot do. The LSAT offers a prediction about the grades a student,
or group of students, will receive in law school, particularly in the first
year. One of its virtues is that it has been, and continues to be, care-
fully studied and critiqued. Those who are inclined to use it with care
cient of .40 with the first year law school GPAs (FYGPA) for admitted test takers, a mean
correlation coefficient of .52 with the projected or actual FYGPAs of all test takers and
that Undergraduate GPA (UGPA) and LSAT together have a mean correlation coefficient
of .49 with actual first year grades).
The LSAT is a weaker predictor of second year grades and a poor predictor of third
year grades. Donald E. Powers, Predicting Law School Grades for Minority and Nonmi-
nority Students: Beyond the First-Year Average, in LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, IV
REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH (1978-1983) 261, 275 (1984) (finding the pre-
dictive validity of the LSAT goes down from the first to the third-year of law school, while
the correlations for UGPA rise). Although first year grades are somewhat predictive of
third year grades, the relationship is not as strong as might first be expected, perhaps be-
cause the most successful students in first year already have most of the benefits of high
grades before they receive third year grades and so have little incentive to work for high
grades, while those who did less well are still in the hunt for jobs and have a strong incen-
tive to improve their grades.
3 There remains a great deal of unexplained and unpredicted variation. As the Law
School Admissions Council notes, "Many factors other than the acquired academic skills
measured by the LSAT contribute to academic performance. In addition there is a certain
amount of measurement error inherent in the test." ANTHONY ET AL., supra note 3, at 4.
Although the test is valid, its predictive power, particularly at the level of individual test
takers and some subgroups, is quite limited. Although it is the best tool we have, it only
predicts 16% of the variation in first year grades among students who actually enroll in law
school. William C. Kidder, The Rise of the Testocracy: An Essay on the LSAT, Conven-
tional Wisdom, ad the Dismantling of Diversity, 19 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 167, 187, 206
(2000)(analyzing and critiquing data showing that the LSAT accounts for only 27% of the
variation in projected FYGPA (mean correlation coefficient of .52) of all test takers, in-
cluding those denied admission, and only 16% of the variation in FYGPA (mean correla-
tion coefficient of .40) among all students actually enrolled in law school and trenchantly
arguing that the current law school admissions and evaluation regime reflects deeply held
cultural norms which disfavor students of color).
4 The test appears to most reliable predict the grades of white male students and there
is evidence of gender and race bias. See William C. Kidder, Portia Denied: Unmasking
Gender Bias on the LSAT and Its Relationship to Racial Diversity in Legal Education, 12
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1 (2000)(analyzing data supporting the existence of gender bias in
the LSAT); Linda Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997); William C. Kidder, Situating Asian Pacific Americans in the Law
School Affirmative Action Debate: Empirical Facts About Thernstrom's Rhetorical Acts, 7
ASIAN L.J. 29, 45-68 (2000)(analyzing admissions data for Asian Pacific Americans and
arguing that the criteria are biased).
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may do so by accounting for its weaknesses and combining it with
other assessment methods.5
The same cannot be said for law school exams. Presumably, suc-
cess in law school should have some predictive relationship to success
in the legal profession.6 In stark contrast to the LSAT however, there
is very little data supporting, or analyzing the presumed predictive re-
lationship between law school exam performance and lawyering. The
studies that have been done are at best equivocal, and some show no
correlation between success in law school, as measured by grades7 and
success in the profession.8 This is a very difficult issue to study.9
While successful law students often go on to be successful lawyers, law
5 The LSAT is a statistically valid test, in contrast to law school exams, which are not
reliable or valid, Linda R. Crane, Grading Law School Examinations: Making a Case for
Objective Exams to Cure What Ails "Objectified" Exams, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 785 (2000)
(arguing that traditional exams are not reliable or statistically valid and that objective ex-
aminations should be used in their place). The LSAT is also a better predictor than UGPA
alone, or any other measure available for the entire group, but we must recognize its limi-
tations. The test offers only some information about any particular individual, not a cer-
tain prediction of how that person will perform in law school, or more importantly, as a
lawyer. Only carefully informed judgment in admissions can select students who will con-
tinue the tradition of American lawyers exercising national leadership and seeking justice.
Blind testing alone cannot achieve that goal and the authors cited above suggest the ways
in which overreliance on the test sacrifices many values in a chimerical pursuit of a very
narrow virtue.
6 Although this is not a self-evident proposition, particularly among law school faculty,
some of whom hold the profession in rather low esteem. Perhaps law school's primary
function should be to prepare students to teach the law, or think critically, or achieve some
other goal. If that is the case, the typical law school program is quite ill conceived and the
special status law schools enjoy as gatekeepers to the profession should be reconsidered.
7 It might be argued that success in law school is best measured by indicators other
than grades. Although there is much sense in that notion, it does not reflect the current
reward structure, which grants high status (journal positions, membership in moot court
and similar organizations and academic awards) and economic benefits (lucrative summer
jobs, high salary jobs upon graduation and high status positions such as clerkships which
lead to high salary jobs) largely on the basis of grades, with first year grades having the
major role in allocating the benefits.
8 Ogloff et al., supra note 1, at 203-20 (reviewing studies assessing law school perform-
ance and professional success and concluding that the data is difficult to interpret and does
not give rise to valid generalizations); James R. P. Ogloff, David R. Lyon, Kevin S. Douglas
& V. Gordon Rose, From the Trenches and Towers: Law School Affirmative Action: An
Empirical Study Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law
School, 25 LAW & SOCIETY INQUIRY 395 (2000)(study showing that minority graduates of
Michigan Law School had lower GPAs of about 0.9%, but satisfaction with law school and
career success similar to white graduates and suggesting that grades do not predict success
or satisfaction in the profession); Kidder, supra note 1, at 197-98 (citing the Michigan data
and an unpublished study done at Boalt Hall and arguing no data supports a predictive
relationship between law school grades and professional success).
9 Assessing success in the profession is problematic for many reasons, including the
difficulties inherent in defining success so that it can be measured. For example, the Michi-
gan study, supra note 8, used current income, self-reported satisfaction, and an index of
service contribution. Other measures can also be used, but all are problematic.
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students with strong first year grades also have significantly better op-
portunities than their less successful peers. Their relative professional
success may reflect those opportunities, as much, or more than, their
particular merit relative to their law school classmates, all of whom
met the same narrow and well-defined admissions criteria. The pro-
fession is also full of lawyers who enjoy professional success but did
not excel in law school. Do law school exams predict success at being
a lawyer? 10 Are there other assessment tools that would assist law
students and law schools in guiding and shaping legal education?
One way to explore the relationship between law school exam
performance and lawyering performance is to consider it in the con-
text of the long running debate about the nature, and testing, of intel-
ligence. Legal education reflects the traditional view that well
designed tests can measure some superordinate, general kind of intel-
ligence which correlates with success across a range of endeavors.
Over the past twenty five years a contending school of thought has
argued that success at life's important endeavors requires a combina-
tion of independent faculties, or intelligences, which combine quite
differently in each person. In this theory, predicting and assessing an
individual's strengths and weaknesses requires more than a single, or
single kind, of assessment tool. The data presented in this paper sug-
gest that multiple intelligences theory has useful applications in law
student assessment.
Traditional intelligence theorists see intelligence as a single, inva-
10 The educational value of law school exams is a separate, and very important ques-
tion. Although it is beyond the subject of this paper, it may be noted that everything
educational theory tells us about testing leads to the conclusion that a single end of year
exam, with no feedback beyond a letter grade, makes little contribution to the educational
experience. The Gonzoga University Institute for Law School Teaching, Gerald Hess, Di-
rector, offers Seven Principles for Good Practice in Legal Education. Principle 4 is: Good
Practice Gives Prompt Feedback. It reads:
Knowing what you know and don't know focuses learning. Students need appropriate
feedback on performance to benefit from courses. When getting started, students need
help in assessing existing knowledge and competence. In classes, students need frequent
opportunities to perform and receive suggestions for improvement. At various points dur-
ing college, and at the end, students need chances to reflect on what they have learned,
what they still need to know, and how to assess themselves. http://law.gonzaga.edu/ilst/
7Pslntro.htm. See also Terri LeClercq, Principle 4: Good Practice Gives Prompt Feedback,
49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 418 (1999)(describing methods for providing good feedback in law
schools); How PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, MIND, EXPERIENCE AND SCHOOL 139-41 (John D.
Bradsford, Ann L. Brown & Rodney R. Cockings eds., 2000) (reporting results of a Na-
tional Research Council study on learning, distinguishing formative assessment, which im-
proves teaching and learning and summative assessment, which measures what has been
learned, and noting that formative assessment is critical to the development of adaptive
expertise, should be continuous and also give students the opportunity to revise their
thinking while they are still engaged with the material or project). The traditional law
school exams has almost none of the formative features suggested by the works cited and
its value as summative assessment is widely assumed and virtually untested.
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riable faculty that is stronger in some people than in others.11 Its de-
velopment follows a predictable pattern. The strength of one's
instrument can be determined by standardized testing at a relatively
young age and remains constant through a lifetime. The traditional-
ists hold that people of high intelligence excel at a broad range of
mental tasks. Testing to measure general intelligence began around
the turn of the nineteenth century, when Alfred Binet and Theodore
Simon developed the first modern tests in an effort to identify re-
tarded children.1 2 There was great enthusiasm for standardized test-
ing during the first half of the twentieth century, as modernism and
the lure of a rational, rule obeying and scientific world dominated
American culture. The assumption of a single, superordinate intelli-
gence remains the received wisdom. It undergirds the traditional view
that dominates standardized testing and is exemplified by the best
known standardized intelligence test, developed by David Wechsler. 13
Others, notably Howard Gardner, champion the idea of multiple
intelligences - a set of independent, abilities, skills or aptitudes that
can be developed, to differing degrees, in everyone. 14 Multiple intelli-
gence theory posits several different faculties which combine in differ-
ent ways in different people and poses a significant challenge to the
idea of testing a single, overall aptitude that predicts performance
across a broad range. As I discuss below, the twin claims for indepen-
dence and importance of each intelligence are at the core of the de-
bate. Gardner lists seven intelligences: Mathematical-logical,
linguistic, interpersonal, intrapersonal, musical, spatial and kines-
thetic. He argues that a person may have great talent in one area and
little talent in another, making talk of general intelligence simplistic
and misleading.
Whatever one's views on the general question, legal educators are
faced with a narrower question. We are educating lawyers. Although
musical, spatial and kinesthetic intelligences are laudable and impor-
11 See, e.g., John Duncan, A Neural Basis for General Intelligence, SCIENCE, July 21,
2000, at 457 (describing tests showing a correlation between people with high scores on
measures of general intelligence and a specific area of strong brain activity and relating
those results to the single intelligence tradition).
12 E.G. BORING, HISTORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 573-75 (1957) (describing
Binet's life and work); HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED 7-25 (1999)(offer-
ing a brief history of psychometrics).
13 See JOSEPH D. MATARAZZO, WECHSLER'S MEASUREMENT AND APPRAISAL OF
ADULT INTELLIGENCE (1972)(updating Wechsler's work for the student and practicing psy-
chologist). Although these sophisticated tools do return scores for separate sub parts, they
are predicated on a single general faculty, with different attributes and components. The
theory of multiple intelligences posits a set of separate, independent, coordinating
faculties.
14 HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND (1993)(adding a new introduction to the first
edition, published in 1983).
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tant, they play a less central role in lawyering than in a range of other
life activities. Lawyers, however, need some combination of the other
four intelligences; linguistic, mathematical-logical, interpersonal and
intrapersonal. In what combinations and to what degree do exams or
other evaluation formats measure development of those faculties?
This paper offers data which suggests that law schools could profitably
use simulations, in addition to exams, to evaluate law students' apti-
tude for lawyering.
I came to think about these questions after I collaborated with
others in designing, and then teaching a lawyering skills course for
seven semesters. The course, Foundation Skills, combined evaluation
by graded simulations 15 and written exams.16 Although the course
was designed to teach some lawyering skills, 17 not to test hypotheses
about intelligence, this paper reports on the performances of more
than 540 students who have taken the course. Analysis of the stu-
dents' performances on both graded simulations and written exams
suggests that lawyering calls upon several independent faculties or
abilities, not all of which are measured by written examination alone.
I. THE INTELLIGENCES AND LAWYERING
A. Law School and Theories of Intelligence
Langdell's fundamental reform of legal education focused the law
school curriculum on the study of written opinions and the doctrine-
centric conception of what it means to "think like a lawyer."' 18 In this
15 A simulation is an exercise in which students are placed in role and required to act as
lawyers carrying out some particular lawyering task. Typically the students are given writ-
ten background material describing the background of the client or situation, the matter,
and describing the setting in which the task must be performed. Simulations give students
the opportunity to integrate a number of separate skills and explore the role of the lawyer.
16 We decided to offer a traditional graded course, rather than a pass/fail lawyering
course. Virtually all courses at our law school are graded, with the exception of Trial Ad-
vocacy and Externship classes. For an interesting empirical study of the related choice
between graded and pass/fail formats for live client clinics, see Stacy L. Brustin & David F.
Chavkin, Testing the Grades: Evaluating Grading Models in Clinical Legal Education, 3
CLIN. L. REV. 299 (1997)(finding that most students prefer graded clinical courses and
recommending that students be given the choice of grades or pass/fail).
17 Foundation Skills is an example of what has become a standard skill course, typically
called an Interviewing, Counseling and Negotiation course (ICN). The course aims to
teach those three skills, as well as fact analysis, persuasive theory development and critical
role reflection.
18 For examples equating doctrinal reasoning with all of legal thinking, or thinking like
a lawyer, see EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1962); Sanford
Levinson, Taking Law Seriously: Reflections on "Thinking Like a Lawyer," 30 STAN. L.
REV. 1071, 1071-75 (1978) (review of RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977) examining conceptions of thinking like a lawyer using appellate opinions ); Cass
Sunstein, Commentary on Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993) (calling
analogy the "most familiar form of legal reasoning" and analyzing its use in appellate opin-
[Vol. 8:247
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conception, law students learned to interpret and manipulate rules to
decide disputed cases. They were trained to think like common law
judges concerned with correct application of general principles to par-
ticular cases. Abstract reasoning (particularly as evinced in timed end
of semester essay exams) came to be the most important measure of
one's promise as a lawyer, almost to the exclusion of all other indica-
tors. Although clinical education, interdisciplinary thought and other
trends have broadened legal education, law school still prizes the abil-
ity to apply principle to facts in a timed, written exam.
There is much criticism of traditional legal education and the doc-
trine-centric view of thinking like a lawyer. The most complete and
influential statement of an alternative vision of legal education is The
MacCrate Commission Report, 19 which catalogs lawyering skills and
values, and gives a prominent place to Legal Analysis (Skill §2). 20 The
MacCrate Report is the most complete explication of the view that
lawyers need to be able to do many things, in addition to analyzing
and manipulating doctrine, to solve the multitude of problems they
confront. Problem solving, in both the broad sense of the term2l and
ions); Daniel Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the
Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992) (analyzing the application of practical reason to
doctrinal reasoning). For a discussion of the doctrine-centric view and other views of
thinking like a lawyer, see generally Kurt Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think
Like a Lawyer, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 121 (1994) (collecting and discussing doctrine-centric and
other uses of the phrase "thinking like a lawyer" as a prelude to a study of what the con-
cept means to first year law students). A separate strand in the literature discusses the
ethical implications of "thinking like a lawyer." See, e.g., James R. Elkins, Thinking Like a
Lawyer: Second Thought, 47 MERCER L. REV. 511 (1996) (lawyerly thinking as amorally
instrumental).
19 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSIONS: NAR-
ROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter, MacCrate Report].
20 MacCrate Report at 135. Although there is much written on appellate legal analysis,
the commentary to Skill §2 notes that the Commission's analysis departs "from the tradi-
tional case-method approach" by emphasizing contexts in which the facts are still being
developed and the lawyer does not yet have complete knowledge of the law. The course,
and this paper, involve legal contexts in which facts are still being developed and I have
argued elsewhere that in those contexts, the twin skills of legal analysis and fact develop-
ment are significantly interdependent. Ian Weinstein, Lawyering in the State of Nature:
Instinct and Automaticity in Legal Problem Solving, 23 VT. L. REV. 1 (1998).
21 DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, & SUSAN PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991), which put the idea of lawyers as problems solvers at
the core of our notion of the lawyerly role. They write:
Clients come to lawyers seeking help in solving problems .... But no matter who the
client, what the substantive legal issues or whether the situation involves litigation or
planning, your principal role as lawyer will almost always be the same- to help the
client achieve effective solutions to their problems.
Id. at 2-3. They use that formula to expand. the definition of the lawyer's role to include
helping clients address non-legal aspects of their problems. Their focus, however, is on the
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its more technical use in cognitive science, 22 has offered an important
framework for a broader and more useful conceptualization of the
multifaceted work lawyers do.
Although few defend the view that lawyers only need to analyze
doctrine to be effective lawyers, some defend law school's narrow fo-
cus on abstract reasoning. According to this view, law school is the
place to learn the central, or superordinate, abstract skill of applying
general rules to particular cases - thinking like a lawyer. That skill,
aptitude or intelligence is seen as the key to all other lawyering activi-
ties. It is both the essential component and the hardest to learn.
Other skills can more easily be picked up in practice, or in summer
jobs, but only law school can teach aspiring lawyers to analyze rules
and apply them to particular cases. This view is not unique to legal
education. Defenders of the special place of doctrinal reasoning fol-
low in the long tradition of psychologists and educators who have
sought to define and measure a single, general intelligence.2 3 Their
efforts have given us I.Q. tests and our contemporary enthusiasm for
testing and sorting in American education.24
The theory of multiple intelligences, championed by Howard
Gardner, offers another view of intelligence, aptitudes or potentials.
In this view, intelligence is composed of a number of independent fac-
ulties, each of which entails a set of skills that enable the individual to
resolve genuine problems or difficulties encountered in the world.2 5
Identifying an intelligence requires more than finding some particular
mental processing ability. The faculty must be broadly recognized
across cultures as valuable and useful in the world. To qualify as an
intelligence, the faculty must also meet eight criteria that support
professional skills rather than the cognitive processes lawyers use.
22 A technical model of human problem solving has been developed by cognitive scien-
tists. See ALLEN NEWELL & HERBERT SIMON, HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING (1972).
Clinical legal educators used those insights to develop a broader view of lawyering.
Anthony Amsterdam's much cited article Clinical Legal Education - A 21st Century Per-
spective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612 (1984) used the language of Newell and Simon's human
problem solving model. See also Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1984) (analyzing how two claimants to a single taxicab can resolve their dispute within a
cognitive science framework); Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise,
Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDuc. 313, 328 n.32
(1995)(applying Newell and Simon to lawyering); Mark Aaronson, We Ask You to Con-
sider: Learning About Practical Judgment in Lawyering, 4 CLIN. L. REV. 247, 291-96
(1998)(discussing the contribution of the cognitive science expert/novice distinction to the
idea of practical judgment).
23 See supra notes 11-13.
24 See generally PETER SACKS STANDARDIZED MINDS: THE HIGH PRICE OF AMERICA'S
TESTING CULTURE AND WHAT WE CAN Do TO CHANGE IT (2000)(describing and critiqu-
ing America's "testing culture").
25 GARDNER, supra note 14, at 60.
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viewing it as independent from other faculties, subject to some objec-
tive verification and plausible from a developmental and evolutionary
standpoint.26
In Frames of Mind, Gardner argues for seven intelligences: lin-
guistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, in-
terpersonal and intrapersonal.2 7 The book, and much of Gardner's
subsequent work, makes the argument for these seven faculties. Al-
though Gardner remains committed to this taxonomy, he is more
strongly committed to the idea that there is a set of independent prob-
lem solving skills or aptitudes than he is to the claim that they are best
understood as exactly this set with the contours he describes.
B. Logical Mathematical Intelligence
Four of Gardner's seven intelligences are particularly relevant to
the practice of law: logical-mathematical, linguistic, interpersonal and
intrapersonal.2 8 Logical mathematical intelligence is, as the name sug-
gests, associated with skill in logic and mathematics. At the core of
this aptitude is the ability to think or reason abstractly. Typically, peo-
ple who excel in this area are able to perform long chains, or series, of
abstract mental operations. Lawyers use logical mathematical intelli-
gence when they construct legal or factual arguments and analyze or
strategize about legal situations. Courts and other legal institutions
use logic to legitimize and guide their exercise of authority, although
the relationship between logic and the force of law is a fundamental
jurisprudential question.29
Law school pays particular attention to logical-mathematical rea-
soning. Students are required to construct abstract, logical arguments
in the classroom and in their examinations. The stress law school
places on logical-mathematical reasoning is understandable for at
least two reasons. First, this is the intelligence traditionally associated
26 Id. at 61-65.
27 Id. at 73-276 (describing and arguing for seven intelligences). In a more recent book,
Prof. Gardner considers additional candidates and adds naturalist and spiritual intelli-
gences. HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED 46-60 (1999). I use his earlier
formulation in this paper because it seemed most directly applicable to lawyering.
28 Three of the seven intelligences, musical, bodily-kinesthetic and spatial intelligences
can be useful to lawyers, and may be key in some very specialized practice settings, but
they seem generally less directly relevant to lawyering, at least in the sense that one can
excel as a lawyer and have little ability in these areas.
29 See e.g., Sunstein, supra note 18 (discussing analogical reasoning); Steven L. Winter
Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989)(arguing that metaphor is the fundamental mode of legal thinking);
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Final Chronicle: Cultural Power, the Law Reviews, and the
Attack On Narrative Jurisprudence, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 545 (1995)(discussing the argument
that narrative is the fundamental mode of legal thinking).
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with the single intelligence view. It remains the skill or aptitude most
widely measured in traditional intelligence testing and upon which
most American educators continue to focus. Second, whether or not
it is the general intelligence of traditional theorists, logical mathemati-
cal reasoning plays an important role in the law. 30 Even if it has to
share its place with three other abilities, logical thinking is a key apti-
tude every lawyer needs. The real contention is over the three re-
maining candidates for independent intelligences of importance to
lawyers: linguistic, interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligence. Most
would agree that these are important skills or aptitudes for many law-
yers. Not everyone agrees about their status. To what degree, if any,
are these three aptitudes significant for lawyers and independent of
logical mathematical intelligence and each other?
C. The Less Controversial-Oral and Written Linguistic Intelligence
At the core of linguistic intelligence is sensitivity to the meaning
and ordering of words. A person with superior linguistic aptitude is
able to choose and sequence words to persuade and educate others, to
remember and use information and to explain and explore linguistic
systems. 31 A person may have strength in either oral or written ex-
pression and Gardner suggests that people who truly excel in one area
often do not show equal aptitude in the other, suggesting a measure of
independence between the two clearly related areas of oral and writ-
ten linguistic intelligence. 32 Lawyers clearly need linguistic intelli-
gence. Much of lawyering requires skill at expressing ideas in writing
and orally. Anecdotal experience also suggests a measure of indepen-
dence between linguistic intelligence and logical mathematical intelli-
gence and between oral and written abilities. Law reviews, are rife
with sophisticated analysis expressed in clumsy, awkward language
and lovely, flowing prose that offers ideas that are, at base, illogical.
We have all heard talks in which bad ideas were well presented and
good ideas hidden in awkward phrasing and bad speaking. There are
many lawyers who speak well but do not write well. Conversely, there
are those who only write well but would not venture out to a meeting
or courtroom. Although some will resist elevating linguistic skill to
the vaunted status of an intelligence, it is an important and difficult
talent to master.
30 Although there is debate over whether legal reasoning is fundamentally deductive,
analogical, metaphorical, or something else, that dispute presumes the centrality of ab-
stract reasoning, whatever form it takes.
31 GARDNER, supra note 14, at 77-78.
32 Id. at 95.
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D. The More Controversial-Personal Intelligences
Intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligences are the two remain-
ing candidates for inclusion in the group of independent aptitudes
central to lawyering. This pair, which Gardner couples with the label
"personal intelligences", may find even less sympathy with traditional-
ists. Intrapersonal intelligence, the development of self-knowledge, is
the ability or aptitude to access one's own feelings and draw upon
them as a means of understanding and guiding one's behavior, and by
example to gain insight into the behavior of others. 33 This skill is cen-
tral to lawyering in at least two respects. First, Gardner identifies self
knowledge at the core of each person's ability to control his or her
own behavior. Lawyers and law students must have the motivation,
self discipline and insight required to carry out complex, long term
projects. Common experience gives us many examples of people who
have great powers of abstract reasoning but who are unable to func-
tion as law students or lawyers because they lack motivation or engage
in a range of other self defeating behaviors. Conversely, there are
many in the law who succeed more by regular and steady effort than
by brilliance.
Self knowledge also powerfully informs the exercise of judgment
that is central to so much lawyering. As we come to better understand
ourselves, we improve our ability to critically analyze our predictions
and assumptions about the future. For example, the litigator who is
motivated to fight hard in court because he or she is angry in his or
her own life will benefit from understanding that motivation. Know-
ing him or herself will enable that lawyer to make decisions less influ-
enced by their own unconscious needs and more centered on the
client's situation. Self knowledge can also be a powerful tool in mak-
ing predictions and interpreting the motivations and actions of others.
As we better understand ourselves, we can use that knowledge to in-
terpret others.
Interpersonal intelligence, the "ability to notice and make distinc-
tions among other individuals, and, in particular, among their moods,
temperaments, motivations and intentions, ' 34 is the second of the per-
sonal intelligences. A lawyer who has insight into others' emotional
states is better able to collaborate with colleagues, work with or
against adversaries and persuade others.35 This is arguably the most
33 Id. at 239.
34 Id.
35 Lawyers have long recognized the value of this, and other, intelligences. Wellman,
the original skills teacher, noted, "[Cross examination] requires the greatest ingenuity; a
habit of logical thought; clearness of perception in general; infinite patience and self-con-
trol; power to read men's minds intuitively, to judge of their characters by their faces, to
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important skill for a lawyer whose practice setting involves client con-
tact, group work or oral advocacy.
This discussion of the personal intelligences has asserted that tra-
ditionalists may be particularly leery about elevating these personal
aptitudes to intelligences: Wariness about the personal intelligences
in the law comes from several different sources and poses some legiti-
mate concerns. First, the measurement and evaluation of the personal
intelligences may suggest to some a return to an earlier era's focus on
character and shared moral outlook as the key qualifications for law-
yers. These notions had a significant exclusionary effect through the
middle of the 2 0 th Century, operating to exclude people of color,
women, some immigrant groups and others from the bar.36 This cri-
tique, however, confuses gaining a clearer understanding of our cogni-
tive processes with the normative question of whether or not we
should value diversity. It may be that an earlier era was correct to
focus on other aptitudes, in addition to abstract reasoning, but defined
or assessed the personal intelligences too narrowly or for goals we
should not endorse.
In that earlier era, many were excluded by the assumption that
only lawyers from the same social class could understand the motiva-
tions and intentions of similarly situated clients and each other. As
lawyers and clients have become more diverse, we can recognize that
personal intelligence is a skill, not a birthright. Caution about empha-
sis on understanding others is warranted, for it can lead some to reject
diversity on the argument that people of different backgrounds have a
difficult time understanding each other and working together. These
problems are much better addressed by working to bring people of
different backgrounds together and learning about difference and how
to deal with it, rather than insisting that the bar be homogeneous.
This criticism of an earlier era's take on personal intelligence
should remind us that objective testing has also been an important
tool for diversifying the bar, legal education and American education
in general. To the extent objective testing, as we currently use it, fails
to identify some important lawyering skills, law schools should face
that challenge by developing other kinds of objective tests and adding
other kinds of evaluation to the mix. While blind graded, objective
appreciate their motives;..." FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS EXAMINATION 8
(1936).
36 Russell Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolu-
tion of the Original Understanding, University of Chicago Roundtable (Forthcoming
2001)(manuscript at 25-26, on file with author)(arguing that the influx of immigrants in the
early 20 th Century fueled the development of the exclusionary ideal of a governing class of
lawyer professionals and citing JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976)).
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examinations have flaws, they are an important tool in achieving some
fairness in evaluating students and aspiring professionals. The chal-
lenge we face today is how to better understand and use the array of
evaluative methods available to us.
Another element in the skepticism about the personal intelli-
gences is their gendered quality in our culture. Popular culture still
assigns being aware of and perceptive about emotions to the feminine
sphere while mathematical-logical reasoning continues to be per-
ceived as male. 37 The focus on these concerns in law school is per-
ceived by many students as "soft" or "touchy-feely," both of which
they typically use as pejoratives. Although these stereotypes are no
longer as powerful as they were, they still exert influence over law
students and law teachers, who continue to understand the personal
intelligences as less important, powerful and legitimate that mathe-
matical-logical thinking.
Whether we call them intelligences or not, a good lawyer needs to
be able to understand doctrine, express that understanding to others,
and have sufficient insight into him or herself and others to make
complex judgements.38 The dual claims that these intelligences are
independent of one another and that each addresses its own important
area of problem solving pose important challenges to legal education.
II. THE COURSE
A. Teaching and Learning
Foundation Skills is a four credit, one semester course designed
to teach basic legal interviewing, counseling and negotiation to classes
of 72 to 96 law students. When I taught the course, the central text
was BINDER, BERGMAN & PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS. 3 9 The
37 For a perceptive and careful analysis of the role gender stereotypes play in law
school teaching and an introduction to the vast and important literature on this complex
issue, see Sandra Farber & Monica Rickenberg, Under-Confident Women and Over-Confi-
dent Men: Gender and Sense of Competence in a Simulated Negotiation, 11 YALE J. L. &
FEMINISM 271 (1999)(discussing the impact of law students' gender stereotypes on the de-
velopment of lawyering skills in a course designed to address the challenges multiple intel-
ligences theory poses to traditional legal education).
38 There are many different ways to categorize and describe the variety of abilities or
skills that lawyers use in the countless contexts in which they work. I have chosen Gard-
ner's now classic formulation. Professor Peggy Cooper Davis has developed a very
thoughtful approach to these issues, significantly informed by Gardner's and a body of
original and important research in the context of legal education at New York University
School of Law. See http://www.nyu.edu/law/workways/.
39 BINDER ET AL., supra note 21. The book was supplemented by law review excerpts,
Model Code and Model Rule Selections and other material. The negotiation texts were
FRANK G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION (1989) and excerpts from ROGER FISHER&
WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (1981). I last taught the class in the spring of 2000. My
colleague, James Cohen, is now teaching the course using much the same structure, but this
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course uses experiential teaching and learning. It is built around four
sets of simulations and a number of exercises. The course was devel-
oped to teach skills to a larger group of students than was possible in
our live client clinics,40 which have low student faculty ratios. We con-
ceived the course as a prerequisite for our live client clinics which
would cover some basics and permit students and teachers in those
courses to focus on more advanced lawyering issues. 41
Students and teachers met in a variety of formats during the se-
mester, in what may be an overly complex effort to balance efficiency
with individual and small group attention and to give students a wide
variety of different experiences. About half the classes were in the
traditional law school setting of the large classroom. I taught the large
classes in variety of formats, including group exercises, lecture, live
demonstration and critique, video demonstration and critique, guest
panels and class discussion. The other half of the classes met in
smaller groups. Students were assigned to twelve-person breakout
classes, each led by a different instructor.42
The small groups also used and met in a variety of formats, in-
cluding exercises and class discussions, although the simulations were
the heart of the small group experience. There were four sets of simu-
lations in the Foundations semester, two minor and two major. The
students worked in pairs on the two minor simulations. The problems
presented one transactional and one litigation setting43 and the minor
simulations were done around the third and sixth weeks of the semes-
ter. The first minor simulation was an initial client interview.44 The
description does not capture his many improvements and only describes the course as I
taught it.
40 In the 1999-2000 school year, Fordham law school had eight clinics, some enrolling
students for one semester and some for two semester, with a total enrollment of about 110.
In that year the Foundation Skills course enrolled 204 students, about one third of whom
were simultaneously enrolled in a live client clinic. Both the clinic and the number of slots
in Foundations has increased.
41 Although the reality is that about two thirds of the clinic students took Foundation
Skills as a co-requisite during this period.
42 The small group instructors included another full time member of the clinical faculty,
a number of Fordham Law School alumni and several people who had taught lawyering
skills at other New York City law schools. Although one alum had about ten years of
practice experience and had taught other courses, most of the group were more recent law
school graduates and my former students. They were about evenly divided between men
and women and came from a variety of practice settings including full service law firms,
smaller law firms, government and teaching.
43 The minor simulations each presented two different problems, one set in a litigation
context and the other in a transactional setting. If a student did the transactional problem
in minor simulation 1, he or she did the litigation problem in minor simulation 2 and vice
versa.
44 The litigation interview setting presented a prospective client who was an uninvolved
witness to a fight in a bar and was hit by a thrown ashtray. The transactional problem
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students were allotted 20 to 25 minutes45 to interview an actor playing
a potential new client seeking legal advice and representation. Three
of the six pairs did their simulations in front of four of their student
colleagues and their small group instructor, and then participated in
an immediate group critique. 46 The other three pairs did their simula-
tion in front of a video camera and later critiqued the tape in class,
along with four other students and the small group instructor. When
the students moved to minor simulation two,4 7 which emphasized
counseling and client decision making, they reversed positions so that
those who videotaped the first time performed live the second time
and those who did the transactional problem the first time, had the
litigation problem the second time and vice versa in each dimension.48
As in minor simulation one, the students were given about 20 minutes
to counsel an actor playing the client.
The two major simulations followed. The students engaged in
major simulation I around week eight of the semester. The simulation
was set as a second meeting with a client who co-owns four small
multi-family dwellings with his or her sister-in-law. They have run the
business without any formal agreement for about ten years and now
each partner is reviewing her or his future plans and business goals.
The immediate questions presented was whether and what kind of for-
mal business structure the partners should adopt. The materials also
permitted the students to explore issues beyond the question of busi-
ness form, including allocating authority among family members, giv-
ing business advice, resolving conflicts about workload and
responsibility and evaluating and planning to address a variety of legal
risks.
The students worked alone in major simulation I and talked with
their actor/clients for up to 45 minutes. Each session was videotaped
and reviewed by the student's small group instructor. Each student
met individually with his or her small group instructor for a one on
involved the initial interview of a client who wants a separation agreement drafted in a
very amicable divorce proceeding which, as it turned out, presented some difficult
problems in the division of assets.
45 The time limit was required because the students perform and are critiqued within a
one hour period. This is just one of the many ways resources had to be rationed in the
course to strike a balance between individual attention and limits on student and faculty
time.
46 We call this the "fishbowl" critique.
47 Here again, half the students did a litigation problem involving a client who must
accept or decline a settlement offer in a §1983 case and the other half worked with the
transactional matrimonial problem from the first minor simulation.
48 A rather complicated scheduling grid would have made all this happen, but each
semester scheduling and other logistical problems intruded on this plan. Most, but not
every student did each kind of problem, one live and one on videotape.
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one critique that typically lasted about an hour. The classes did not
meet in any other format during the week to ten days over which ma-
jor simulation I was videotaped and critiqued.
Major simulation II typically fell in the twelfth week of the se-
mester and presented a negotiation problem. 49 The students were
paired. Our goal was to have each team negotiate against a practicing
lawyer, typically recent graduates of the law school's clinical program,
but given the realities of life in practice for young lawyers, each se-
mester some students negotiated against other students. The students
could negotiate for up to 45 minutes and the session was videotaped.
The small group instructors critiqued the videotapes with the pairs of
students in sessions that typically lasted an hour to an hour and a half.
Each of the simulations was preceded by classwork designed to
prepare the students to perform in the simulation and analyze and
learn from the experience. The initial interviewing simulation was
preceded by several large classes on the goals and techniques of legal
interviewing, including planning, structuring and question asking,50 le-
gal problem solving and theory development and the professional and
legal obligations of lawyers. This unit also included two small classes
built around question asking exercises. 51
49 The students continued to represent the client they counseled in major simulation I.
They were given additional materials informing them that their client had decided to either
buy or sell a portion of the business from his or her partner and wanted to make some
changes in the way the business was run and work was allocated between the two. The
students negotiated the sale or purchase of an interest in the business and other terms, and
were free to raise and resolve other issues.
50 The formats of these classes varied and included i)a demonstration videotape of a
doctor and patient interaction, followed by class discussion to raise issues of professional
role, ii)a brief written hypothetical used as the basis for a large group planning exercise,
iii)a demonstration video of an initial client interview followed by discussion of interview
structure, iv)a large group brainstorming session to identify legal theories based on a brief
written hypothetical, v)a lecture on narrative theory and cognitive framing, vi)a class dis-
cussion on excerpts from the Code of Professional Responsibility, vii)the initial interview
scenes from the film Anatomy of a Murder to raise the classic issue of whether lawyers
should first explain the law or get the facts, viii)a lecture on Ronald Gilson's, Value Crea-
tion by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239 (1984), to offer
a model for and identify the goals of transactional lawyering.
51 One hour was given over to a small class devoted to an exercise in asking open and
closed questions. This was the first small class and was also designed to introduce the
participatory, experiential model. The students were paired. The exercise began with one
asking the other only open questions on an assigned topic (describe a room). Next the
other asked only closed questions on a different topic (what do you do yesterday morning).
The teachers circulated and explained and enforced the form limitations. After the ques-
tioning exercises, the students discussed their experiences, typically concluding that the
forms serve different purposes and must be properly sequenced according to some set of
goals and a plan to achieve a given purpose.
Another two hour small class was used for an exercise in which the students were in
the role of prosecutors and planned for and interviewed an actor playing a witness to a
convenience store robbery. During the planning they identified their goals, potential legal
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The counseling simulations were preceded by large classes that
focused on the role of lawyers in client decision making. 52 The broad
orientation of the course was sympathetic to client centered law-
yering, but other models were presented and I was always explicitly
pluralistic, telling the students that my central goal was to empower
them to make role choices within the broad confines of their legal
obligations. The major counseling simulation was also preceded by a
small class, devoted to planning for the simulation. The first class af-
ter the major simulation was also a small group class, given over to
debriefing the exercise. 53
Around week ten or eleven, we moved to legal negotiation. This
section typically involved three or four large classes to introduce basic
negotiation theory.54 As in the earlier unit, those classes mixed exer-
theories and issues, the facts that might support or disprove those theories and some of the
potential motivators and inhibitors for this witness. Each student then asked one or two
series of questions, we critiqued the questioning and, time permitting, tried another round
of questioning and critiqued that second round.
52 These classes typically involved some combination of i) debriefing of minor simula-
tion 1 in the large class to make the point that even simple seeming matters, such as the
initial interview in a seemingly simple matter, can give rise to very different stories and
approaches, ii) a portion of an audiotape of an actual genetics counseling session to raise
issues about neutrality in style and substance in counseling. In some semesters the class
wrote brief reaction papers after hearing the tape. I then tabulated and summarized their
reactions and discussed the results in the next class. There was always enough diversity
and similarity in views and reactions to make for interesting and challenging discussion, iii)
a video of model counseling to motivate discussion of the structure of a counseling session,
iv) a demonstration video of an extremely aggressive, paternalistic counseling session to
motivate discussion of authority in counseling sometimes, sometimes followed by the same
kind of reaction paper described above, v)class discussion of the characteristics and pros
and cons of client centered lawyering, paternalistic lawyering and purely instrumentalist
lawyering, vi) class discussion based on excerpts from the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility to identify the dominant view on allocation of authority between lawyer and client,
and vii) an exercise in which students received a one page hypothetical and asked to decide
how they, as clients, would choose to resolve a case. The range of choices and reasons
illustrated the diversity of goals and views, even among a relatively homogenous group.
53 Initially, we used that debriefing class to play excerpts of various students' tapes.
The idea was to show them the variety of client types and student approaches. Although
many of us continued to play some student tape excerpts, many of us devoted a substantial
portion of this class to showing and discussing a demonstration tape of the simulation. I
initially made the tape to show the students an approach very few of them took. I was
much less focused on the details of the law and much more oriented toward discovering the
client's goals and thinking about a range of legal and non-legal solutions. At first, a fair
number of students were highly critical of my approach, charging me with failing to be a
lawyer, as they conceived the role. Over time we were successful in helping the students
plan and execute more creative, less rigidly law defined sessions and their criticism of the
demonstration tape became considerably less extreme.
54 These classes included i)playing a modified, multi round prisoners dilemma game,
followed by a lecture on elementary game theory to introduce the cooperation/competition
tension in negotiation, ii)discussion of the style strategy distinction in negotiation,
iii)discussion of choosing among and combining the three strategies (problem solving, ad-
versarial and cooperative) and two styles (competitive and cooperative) of negotiation,
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cises, videotapes and lecture and discussion. There were also two or
three small classes before the negotiation major simulation.55 There
were only two or three classes left in the semester after the negotia-
tion simulation. One or two of those classes was been given over to a
variety of topics, none of which have met the challenges posed by the
end of the semester. The last class was devoted to a description of the
exam and my best effort at inspirational remarks on lawyering.
B. Evaluation
Students were evaluated at different points in the semester and in
a variety of ways. They received feedback from each other and the
instructors during the exercises in both the large and small classes.
Their simulation performances were critiqued by their small group in-
structors and their simulation partners and observing classmates. The
students critiqued themselves, and some of their classmates, in oral
critiques immediately following the minor simulations. They critiqued
their performances in the major simulations during reviews of the
videotapes with their small group instructors and also wrote one to
three page memos analyzing their work on the major simulations.
Students also received a final letter grade at the end of the semes-
ter. That grade was determined by their performance on five graded
parts of the course.56 The five components were the grades on each of
the two major simulations, 57 a grade from the small group professor
iv)discussion of the structure typical of each strategy, common tactical approaches typical
of each strategy, v)a demonstration video to illustrate the structure of negotiation, and
vi)discussion of some professional responsibility issues in legal negotiation including issues
around control of strategy and outcome and bluffing and deception.
55 The small classes included a negotiation exercise involving a low information, high
overlap situation (the students do not know that each party would gladly agree to what the
other side would view as a very favorable settlement), which illustrates the power of the
first offer to the unwary - students almost all accept very high or low initial offers, not
realizing that just because the offer is within their range, they might still information bar-
gain to determine if they can do better. Another small class sometimes reprised the low
information, high overlap type of problem, with a dollop of room for problem solving.
Many of the students did not rush to settle the second time, although they did not all take
advantage of the opportunity to problem solve. This second negotiation showed many of
them that they had learned something. In later versions of the class we added a planning
session which addressed specific issues in the major simulation.
56 The students received a numerical grade between 1 and 20 for each subscore. At the
end of the semester, I used a spreadsheet to calculate each student's standard deviation
from the mean for each subscore and then averaged across the five scores to calculate a
"Z" score. The basic idea is to calculate how far from average each student's score was for
each subscore. Those results are averaged, rather than simply using the raw score for each
subscore. This tends to even out variations caused by differing distributions of scores in
each subscore. The students were ranked by "Z" score and grades assigned consistent with
the law school's grade distribution policy.
57 Students worked by themselves on Major I and with a partner on Major II. The
grades for Major II, the negotiation exercise, fell in a narrower, higher range than the
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assessing their overall participation in the small class and the grades
on each of the two sections of the final examination. The grade for
overall participation in the small class was the most subjective ele-
ment, reflecting an assessment of the work in the minor simulations
and the student's participation in the exercises and critiques of other
students' minor simulations. The small group professor was responsi-
ble for three of the components, or 60% of the grade 58 and the large
class professor is responsible for the two exam components, or 40% of
the grade. 59
Grading simulations presents challenges. 60 Consistency, objectiv-
ity, fairness and validity are all difficult issues. These grades were as-
signed to students we knew, who were performing complex,
multidimensional tasks. There were almost always a number of ap-
propriate and useful approaches and a variety of ways for the students
to display different strengths and weaknesses. The grading guidelines
for the simulations were quite general. We told the students that their
simulation work would be evaluated in three areas: critique, prepara-
tion and execution, and in that order of priority. I did not assign spe-
grades for Major I. The range was narrower because the students in each pair tended to
receive the same, or similar grades. Although the students in each pair could receive dif-
ferent grades, instructors tended not to differentiate between partners. This was a bit
problematic, given the narrow three or four point range of grades overall. The grades were
slightly higher because faculty reluctance to give low grades led to the tendency to bunch
the grades in the top part of the range. It may also be that the students performed better -
their exams reflected better comprehension of the negotiation material as compared to
other course material.
58 I had final responsibility for all the grades. After consultation, I set out the grading
criteria and insisted that the grades be distributed in a rough curve, as described below. If
I used this format again, I would address the very subjective nature of the general partici-
pation grade with guidelines and a more strictly enforced curve. I would also hope that the
results of this study would encourage us to be more systematic, and less subjective, in our
assessments of students.
59 Over the six semesters discussed in this article, I graded all the exams, with the two
exceptions. I split the grading with a colleague during the second semester I taught the
class and another colleague taught a 24 student evening section in Spring 2000 and graded
those exams.
60 There appears to be very little written on grading simulations. The most complete
clinical bibliography lists no articles on grading simulations in either the Assessment &
Evaluation/Grading or Simulation sections, although some pieces my research has not cov-
ered may address the subject. J.P. Ogilvy & Karen Czapanskiy, Clinical Education: An
Annotated Bibliography (second edition), CLIN. L. REV. Spec. Issue I, at 1, 22, 24 (2001).
One piece that appears to address the issue is found in Arturo Lopez Torres & Mary Kay
Lundwall, Bibliography: Moving Beyond Langdell II: An Annotated Bibliography of Cur-
rent Methods for Law Teaching, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 34 (2000)(citing Andrew L. Strauss,
Creating and Conducting In-Class Simulations in Public International Law: A Producer's
Guide, 4 ILSA J. Irr'L. & COMP. L. 669-81 (1998)(discussing creating and grading simula-
tions)). A good example of the literature on simulations, which does not generally address
or support grading is, Richard K. Neumann, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 725 (1989)(discussing methods of critiquing simulation).
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cific percentages to each area, divide the simulation into subtasks or
assign any particular weight to the written planning and critique
memos the students produced. I offered narrative guidance to the stu-
dents and instructors, explaining the goals for each of the three
criteria.
The quality of the student's self-critique was the most important
factor. The theory is that developing the ability to analyze their own
performances and identify ways to improve their lawyering was the
most important goal of the class. We also viewed critique as the as-
pect of the exercise students can most control and least subject to the
unpredictability of lawyering. If a student missed an issue in planning
and ended up with an actor playing a client with whom a student had
particular problems, he or she should still be able to analyze why
those things happened and how they might be addressed in the future.
We also told students that we expected the critiques to make use of
the theory and vocabulary from the readings and looked for evidence
of familiarity with those concepts during the critique sessions. We
urged the students to be specific in their critiques and asked them to
come to the video review sessions having watched the tape and made
notes to prepare to guide the discussion to particular portions of the
simulation and be ready to discuss the language they used and other
details of the session.
In our faculty meetings we discussed the issues we anticipated
would arise in the critiques and developed lists of issues we expected
students would raise, or toward which we planned to guide the con-
versation. We also identified our expectations of the students' prepa-
ration for the critique, including viewing the videotape and developing
an agenda for the session. The faculty usually shared our expectations
and plans in a meeting before the critiques and then debriefed by
sharing themes and experiences from the sessions. My experience, in-
formed by these debriefing sessions, was that students who were able
to discuss specific aspects of the simulation and relate them to some
overall theme about how they would approach a similar task in the
future scored well on the critiques. I sometimes feared that, like a job
interview, a good critique was one in which the instructor was made to
feel interesting and engaging. Although I tried to counter this ten-
dency by focusing on how conversant the student was with the simula-
tion and the course material, and how he or she wove those strands
together, the subjective nature of the evaluation remained a concern.
The second factor in evaluating the simulations was the quality of
the preparation. We ranked this second because we wanted to send a
message about the importance of preparation and because we thought
it more within the students' control than the execution of the simula-
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tion. In major simulation I the students were given a planning form
and required to submit the form immediately before the simulation.
In major II we did not give out a form, but directed students to work
with their partners to create their own planning document. Some stu-
dents also prepared charts, outlines and other material for their own
use during the simulation. The videotapes revealed their use of other
material and we typically collected and discussed that material in the
critique. Planning is the grading factor for which we most consistently
had clear, written evidence. 61
The third factor was the execution of the simulation. I ranked
execution third in an effort to decrease the tendency some students
have to address their anxieties about simulation by "blaming the simu-
lation" during the critique - that is the tendency to focus the critique
on explaining why the actor was bad and the problem was bad and the
lighting was bad, all of which explains why the student did not do a
"good job." I tried to convey the message that because the simulation
is dynamic, aspects of it were simply beyond their control. The actor
may misstep, or the student's choices turn out to be poor ones for
reasons he or she could not have foreseen. The simulations are dy-
namic and unpredictable, like real lawyering. Sending a clear message
about that unpredictability was intended to take the focus off whether
they did the simulation correctly or incorrectly, or well or badly, and
encourage them to be thoughtful and analytic about what happened.
We understand that frame of mind to be at the heart of preparing
students to be responsible professionals in a complex profession.
While execution is ranked third, it was one of the three major
criteria for evaluating student performance. In evaluating execution
we tried to focus on how the session was structured, how the students
executed particular questioning and listening skills, their choice of le-
gal constructs, the degree of factual development and the persuasive-
ness of their reasoning. The students' approaches to all these
elements should have been informed by the class material.
The two graded simulations, as well as the general participation
factor, were evaluated on a 20 point scale. I learned that the small
group professors were reluctant to give grades they, and the students,
viewed in absolute terms as low, and so the grading was in increments
of .5 from 17 to 20. I insisted that the grades generally fall on a bell
61 My impression, unsubstantiated by more than anecdote and eyeballing grades is that
preparation is also the factor least likely to distinguish students from each other. Most
students do about the same amount of preparation, with relatively few doing notably more
or less, but again impressionistically, most of those who do notably more preparation per-
form better in critique and execute better than average.
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curve, around a median of 18.5, but did not enforce a strict curve. 62
The remaining 40% of the grade was determined by the final ex-
amination. For the first two semesters I gave an in class exam. For
the last five semesters I gave a take home exam. All the exams were
divided into two 20 point sections, and each section has two questions.
The first section covered interviewing and counseling and the second
was on legal negotiation.
The in class exam included one section in which a videotaped
lawyering demonstration was presented, along with a transcript. The
students were then asked questions based on the videotape. The
other section presented a two to three page hypothetical, with ques-
tions based on the hypothetical. Concerns about the time pressures of
the in class exam, and my own desire to read typewritten answers, led
me to move to a take home exam. The take home exam used the
same two-section format, with a written hypothetical for each section.
Typical interviewing and counseling questions presented students
with two different clients with whom the student was scheduled to
meet in a day or two. Students were asked to write an interview plan
for each client or discuss issues of allocation of authority related to
decisions each client has to make.63 The typical negotiation questions
asked students to plan one or two negotiations and identify style and
strategy choices, likely offers and counteroffers and predict their op-
ponents' choices. 64 All of the exams included one question that re-
quired some analysis of the Code and Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The negotiation section sometimes included a ques-
tion asking students to decide whether a given representation in a ne-
gotiation was permissible puffing or impermissible lying. The
62 In practice this meant I would ask the small group leaders whose grades were much
higher or lower than the curve would permit to justify and sometimes change a few grades.
I was, however quite sympathetic when my more experienced colleagues explained that the
particular group of 12 was especially strong or weak and the grades were not distributed on
a bell curve. In later semesters I standardized each subscore as part of my statistical efforts
to make the final grades more valid and account for this problem.
63 One exam presented a client with a legally solid, but morally questionable claim for
an initial interview and a client in the midst of litigation who had qualms about pursuing a
legitimate, but hurtful line of deposition inquiry against a former employer. The students
were asked to compare their role choices in the two situations and to discuss at least two
particular lawyering techniques they would employ to realize their lawyering model. An-
other presented a client returning to the lawyer to redraft a will, after realizing large invest-
ment gains from very speculative investments. Students were asked to develop an
interview plan and discuss whether and why they raise or ignore the appropriateness of
such investments for their client.
64 One exam put the students in the role of negotiating on behalf of a client who was
buying an office and subleasing some of the space to another company with which the
client had a preexisting business relationship. Typical for these exams was the pairing of a
negotiation context more suited to competitive negotiation with a context more suited to a
problem solving negotiating strategy.
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interviewing and counseling section sometimes asked them to analyze
provisions allocating decision making authority between lawyer and
client.
III. THE DATA
Data was available for 544 Fordham University School of Law
students65 who took the course in six different semesters.66 All indi-
vidually identifying information was stripped and the individual scores
were coded for gender, year in law school and race where available.
Five scores were available for each student. The general participation
grade, the grade for Major Simulation I, Major Simulation II, Section
I of the exam and Section II of the exam. Statistical analysis was per-
formed to determine the correlations among the various grades, clus-
tering of the students' patterns of performance and any correlations
among gender, race or year in school and the clusters.
IV. RESULTS
A. Correlation Analysis
Both correlation 67 and cluster68 analysis support the hypothesis
that the two types of evaluation, simulation and exam, measured dif-
65 The sample is selected from a very high achieving group, as is the case with any study
at students enrolled at a very selective professional or graduate school. Fordham receives
over 5000 applications for its entering class of about 450 day and evening students, and
makes offers to about 20% of the applicants. Although it is a laudably diverse student
body for an American Law School, the class is quite homogeneous in many respects, such
as test scores and prior achievement in school.
66 All data were the results of regularly conducted tests and evaluations and was ana-
lyzed for the purpose of evaluating and comparing instructional techniques. This study
made use of pre-existing data and no data was collected for this study.
67 The results of the correlation analysis are set out in Table 1, at 33 and discussed infra,
at 32-39. Correlation studies are a measure of the relationship between a presumed predic-
tive element and the thing it is presumed to predict. For example, if a spelling pretest is
presumed to predict the result of the final spelling test, a correlation study of the two tests
could be performed. If every student got the same number of answers correct on the
pretest and the final test, or there were some other constant relationship such as every
student improving by the same percentage from pretest to retest, there would be a 1 to 1
correspondence between the two. The pretest would be perfectly predictive and the corre-
lation coefficient would be 1. If the results on the pretest bore no predictable relationship
to the final test, that is, if some students did very well on the pretest and badly on the final
test, while other showed the reverse pattern and others were distributed in between, there
would be no, or a statistically insignificant (the result could not be distinguished from a
random result) relationship and the correlation coefficient would either be reported as
statistically insignificant or 0.01. The correlation study offers data on whether, and to what
degree, there is a constant, predicable relationship between the things analyzed. High cor-
relation coefficients can leave a good deal of unexplained variation. Correlation gives in-
formation about average performance across the whole group.
68 The results of the cluster analysis are set out in Table 2, at 41. Cluster analysis is
defined infra, at note 85 and the results of the analysis are discussed infra, at 40-47.
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ferent and independent skills, abilities or intelligences. The relative
strength of the correlations among the subscores for each of the two
kinds of assessment, examination and simulation, compared to the
weak correlations between simulation and examination scores, is evi-
dence of the relative independence of the skills measured by each
form of assessment. Students who scored above average on one of the
simulation subscores tended to perform above average on the other
simulation subscore. Although those students also broadly tended to
score above average on the two exam subscores, that relationship was
not as strong as the relationship among the simulation components.
TABLE 169
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN 5 INDIVIDUAL SUBSCORES
1-gen'l
Test partic. 2-coun. sir 3-neg. sim 4-ex. coun. Q 5-ex. neg. Q
1-gen'l part 1.0
2-coun. sim. .49 1.0
3-neg. sim. .46 .40 1.0
4-ex. coun. Q .17 .18 .19 1.0
5-ex. neg. Q .24 .26 .23 .36 1.0
There was high correlation of scores among the simulation com-
ponents. Subscore 2 and 3, the scores on the two major simulations,
were most highly correlated with subsocre 1, the general participation
grade. 70 The two major simulations, subscores 2 and 3, were strongly
correlated with each other, 71 although the relationship between the
two simulations was not as strong as the relationship between each of
the major simulations and the general participation grade. 72
69 All the correlation results are statistically significant, (p < .001), largely because the
sample size is so large. Any correlation analysis using this much data would likely reveal
some patterns not explicable by chance, although the causes of those patterns might be
hard to determine.
70 Subscore 1, general participation, had a correlation of .49 with subscore 2, the coun-
seling simulation, and .46 with subscore 3, the negotiation simulation. Student who did
well on at least one major simulation had a strong tendency to get a high general participa-
tion grade. If a student did poorly on the major simulation, they tended to get a low
general participation grade.
71 Subscores 2 and 3, the two major simulations, had a correlation of .40.
72 This suggests that faculty who liked one simulation by a student were likely to give a
high grade to same student's other work in the small group. See infra note 73. The higher
correlation between the subjective measures than that between the blind graded measures
is troubling. It suggests that some of the correlation among the subjective elements may
flow from preconceptions or assumptions about the student based on earlier work, rather
than the work at hand. There is the danger that an early strong grade will attract other
strong grades for the student and a early weak grade will be difficult to overcome. The
impact of non-blind grading on clinical evaluation might receive further study, perhaps
using regression analysis. It could be useful to determine if blind and known subject grad-
[Vol. 8:247
Testing Multiple Intelligences
Both the general participation grade and the simulation grades
evaluate tasks that require oral linguistic, interpersonal and intraper-
sonal intelligences, as well as logical mathematical intelligence. Stu-
dents who impressed their evaluators as having strength in the first
three areas over the course of the semester and who thus received
high general participation grades would be very likely to present those
same strengths in the major simulations. The slightly lower correla-
tion between the two simulations may best be explained by the
probability of some students having a bad day for one of the two simu-
lations and so not meeting the potential they had exhibited during the
longer observation period offered by the general participation
grading.
The two parts of the exam, subscores 4 and 5, had a strong corre-
lation with each other, but not as strong as the correlations among the
three simulation components. 73 The correlation between the two
exam questions seems straightforward; students who have strong writ-
ten linguistic abilities and good logical mathematical ability - the good
test takers - will tend to do well on any test.74 The higher correlations
among the subjective grades may reflect some combination of the
graders tendency to confirm their own judgments by giving high
grades to those to whom they have given high grades and the consis-
tency of their subjective judgments of known students.
The simulation subscores had very weak correlations with the
exam tests on the same material.75 This weak correlation between
ing diverge consistently, and if so, what factors tend to explain the differences.
73 Subscores 4 and 5, the two blind graded parts of the exam, had a correlation of .36.
This is not as strong a correlation as among the simulation components, which were not
blind graded and gives rise to the concern about the subjectivity of the simulation grades.
74 Successful test takers tend to be good writers who work well under time pressure.
Good writing, characterized by clear, grammatical and well constructed sentences, will
often garner high marks, if it is accompanied by some modicum of logic. This is not to
devalue good writing; it is a tremendous asset to a lawyer, in part because it remains scarce
in relationship to the demands of the marketplace. It is not, however, the only valuable
skill for a lawyer, nor is it is a reliable predictor of other lawyering skills.
75 The correlation between the scores for the negotiation simulation and the negotia-
tion exam question and between the negotiations simulation and the counseling exam
question are quite weak. The numbers that follow are statistically significant but very
weak correlations. As explained supra note 70, the large sample size makes it likely that
even very small correlations will be statistically significant. That should not be confused
with the explanatory significance of the result. Subscore 3, the negotiation simulation, and
subscore 5, the negotiation question on the exam, had a correlation of .23. One way to
think about this correlation is to note that performance on the simulation explained less
than 5% of the variation in exam performance. Subscore 2, the counseling simulation, and
subscore 5, the negotiation question on the exam, had a slightly higher correlation of .26,
explaining just over 5% of the variation. The correlation between the general participation
grade and the counseling simulation, .49, accounts for 25% of the variation between those
two subscores. The negotiation exam test had a slightly higher correlation with all the
simulation subscores than did the counseling exam test. Subscore 5, the negotiation exam
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each simulation and its examination counterpart would have surprised
and disappointed me before I taught the course. My working assump-
tion while designing the class was that there was a relatively straight-
forward relationship between theory and experience. I thought the
course could achieve my goals by offering a combination of the two,
alternating relatively small pieces of theory and experience. I as-
sumed that most students would simultaneously improve in each
sphere, developing both their practical skills and their abstract power
to analyze both the skills and the substantive areas in which they exer-
cised those skills. I now appreciate that the interrelationship between
theory and experience, as it leads to learning, is much more complex
than I assumed. That greater complexity stems, in no small measure,
from the independence among the various aptitudes I am trying to
help students develop.
My experience in the course made me rethink how experience
and theory work, or do not work, together for a particular student.
Some students can recite the theory, but remain unable to execute it
or identify its components in practice. This can be understood as an
aspect of the independence of multiple intelligences. A student with
strong logical mathematical aptitude may be able to recite the ele-
ments of the canonical counseling model, but may lack the interper-
sonal skill to lead a client through it or the intrapersonal skill to
analyze his or her own performance. The data suggest that more typi-
cally students combine strong personal intelligences and less well de-
veloped test taking abilities.76
Another wrinkle in analyzing the relationship between theory
and practice in this course is accounting for the textures of the particu-
lar theoretical contexts on which the class focused.77 Broadly speak-
ing, negotiation theory is better developed and more accessible to
legally trained thinkers than counseling theory. The data shows that
the negotiation exam question correlated more strongly with each of
the simulations than did the counseling exam question, which was
least predictive of performance on any other indicator. This is consis-
question, test had a correlation of .24 with the subscore 3, the negotiation simulation. Sub-
score 4, the counseling exam question had correlation of .18 with its simulation counter-
part, subscore 2.
76 See infra at 931-34.
77 Legal reasoning, like all reasoning, is context sensitive. Each domain of knowledge
has its own characteristic style of analysis. Legal educators need to better understand the
distinctive nature of legal analysis and account for the progression of students from novice
to expert legal analysts. Weinstein, supra note 20; see generally Bradsford et al., supra note
10 (recommending, based upon a review of current research in education and cognitive
science, that educators should strive to help students become adaptive experts, teaching
deep knowledge in ways appropriate to the specific subject area, rather than covering the
broadest swath of factual material).
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tent with my sense that client counseling, as a theoretical area of
study, presents unique challenges for law students. In comparison to
negotiation theory, with its well developed taxonomy of styles and
strategies and links to game theory,78 client interviewing and counsel-
ing presents less well defined issues that typically end in judgment
calls about how to participate in a dynamic interaction. It is a much
less well theorized area in the law than negotiation. That may be be-
cause it has been less studied, or because it is much more complex or
perhaps because it is not well suited to the kind of theory favored by
law schools and lawyers. 79 Although I continue to believe that study-
ing interviewing and counseling makes some people better counsel-
ors,80 my experience and this data make me think that developing the
skill of legal counseling is a very complex learning task.
The very weak correlation between performance on the simula-
tion in a given area and the test question in that area calls for further
study and perhaps rethinking of our use of theory in skills teaching. It
appears that executing a robust theoretical model in a simulation is a
very high level skill, which many students cannot execute as begin-
ners. The theory of multiple intelligences gives us another way to
think about how many different, independent demands a simulation
places on our students and how much variation there is among stu-
dents' particular combinations of abilities. Perhaps it would be useful
to teach some high level theory as a long term investment, but to also
try to offer some very basic, stripped down models to inform develop-
ing skills simulation. It may also be useful to work in greater depth,
sacrificing coverage of material, to give more students the opportunity
to integrate theory into their simulations. 81
78 See e.g., JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT RAU & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, PROCESSES
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 73-191 (1996)(presenting traditional negotiation theory with
style/strategy distinction, taxonomies of each and game theory); GIFFORD, supra note 39,
at 13-22 (same).
79 Efforts to use the very well developed theories from psychology and related disci-
plines have a problematic history in law schools. Although David Binder, Paul Bergman
and Susan Price made an enormous contribution to legal education by applying psychologi-
cal insights to attorney client interactions, BINDER ET AL., supra note 21, their orientation
has earned them criticism from many, including a good portion of my students, who criti-
cized the book as soft, "touchy-feely" and not appropriate for law school.
80 In my experience, it makes some people better analysts of other interviewers and
counselors and it makes others better at both analyzing and doing it. This is another exam-
ple of the independence of the skills or aptitudes required for carrying out these tasks and
the skills or aptitudes required for analyzing them.
81 The quality, sequencing and assessment of the impact of theoretical material all pose
issues. We need better counseling theory, whatever that might look like. It may also be
the case that many law students do not sufficiently master, or perhaps even read, the the-
ory until after they have done the simulations and are preparing for exams at the end of
the semester. Although the fact that most of the good exam takers do well on the simula-
tions suggests that sequencing is not the key issue, this data does not offer any but the
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Perhaps as expected, when all the small group work is compared
to the exams, the correlation between those two parts of the course is
somewhat higher than among the individual pieces from each subset.
The two exam question subscores, together, correlated somewhat bet-
ter with the combined simulation scores than did any of the sub-
parts.82 This is consistent with the unremarkable proposition that
students who did well in the simulations tended, overall, to do well in
the exam, and combining the data in each part smoothed out the dif-
ferences between particular subparts.
The higher correlation, 83 or greater dependence, among the sub-
scores in each part of the course, simulation and exam, than between
the two subsets, simulation and exam, suggests that each evaluative
method tests different skills, abilities or performances and that those
skills or abilities are, to some degree, independent of each other.
While some students perform well or poorly on all parts, as would be
expected if the simulations and exam measured the same skill, ability
or intelligence, a significant portion of the class performed much bet-
ter on one kind of test than on the other.
B. Cluster Analysis
Cluster analysis84 was also performed on the data. The patterns
revealed by the cluster analysis provides additional support for the
explanatory power of the multiple intelligences theory in interpreting
the students' performances. 85 The best fit divided the group of 544
grossest measure, as a simple overall score, of how well any student understood the theory
at the time of the simulation and in this particular course counseling, which appears to
offer the problematic relationship between theory and practice, was offered early in the
semester. Finally, the last point also makes it clear that this data offers a very limited
assessment of the role of theory in the process of developing lawyering skills.
82 Subscores 1, 2 and 3, the simulations and general participation scores, taken together
had a correlation of .32 with subscores 4 and 5, the two exams questions, taken together.
This data is not reported on the chart. The results are statistically significant, (p < .05).
83 These are relative degrees of dependence or independence.
84 "Cluster analysis classifies a set of observations into two or more mutually exclusive
unknown groups based on combinations of interval variables. The purpose of cluster anal-
ysis is to discover a system of organizing observations, usually people, into groups where
members of the group share properties in common." DAVID STOCKBURGER, MUL-
TIVARIATE STATISTICS: CONCEPTS, MODELS AND APPLICATIONS, at http://www.psychstat.
smsu.edu/multibook/mlt04m.html. The basic idea of the cluster analysis is to find groups,
or clusters, of students whose pattern of performances were similar. The statistical trick is
to find the right set of clusters. As the group is divided into smaller units, more patterns
can be found. For this data, division into four clusters best fit the data.
85 As argued below, the exam scores cluster or group in patterns that fit the multiple
intelligences hypothesis, although the cluster analysis only looks at the scores. Stockburger
notes, "Cluster analysis methods will always produce a grouping. The groupings produced
by cluster analysis may or may not prove useful for classifying objects. If the groupings
discriminate between variables not used to do the groupings and those discriminations are
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students for whom data was available into four groups. The 94 stu-
dents in cluster one, the low performing group, scored below the mean
for the whole group on all five subscores and had the lowest average
scores on all five subscores. 86 Cluster two, the 156 high performing
students, scored above the mean on all five subscores and had the
highest average scores, out of the whole group, on four of the five
subscores. Cluster three, the 184 high simulation/low examination
scoring students, scored around the mean, and below cluster two on
the three simulation based subscores and dipped below the mean and
close to group 1 on the two exam subscores.87 Cluster four, the 110
lower simulation/high examination scoring students, had simulation
scores around the mean for the whole group and just below the simu-
lations scores of cluster three, putting them in third place for the simu-
lations. On the exam, however, these students scored above the
mean, switching places with and outscoring high achieving cluster 2 on





18.5 -4- Cluster 1
18- -a- Cluster 2
-1r- Cluster 3
17.5- -)- Cluster 4
17-
16.5 , , I
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5
useful, then cluster analysis is useful." Id.
86 The range of exam scores was both lower and smaller than the range of simulation
scores. I partially accounted for this problem in the final grading by standardizing the
scores and measuring standard deviations for each subscore, statistical procedures which
helped minimize the unfairness caused by the differences among the subscores. This study,
however, uses the unstandardized scores. There are actually only three different values for
the four clusters for each exam question, with clusters 1 and 3 at the same value for sub-
score 4 and clusters 2 and 4 at the same value for subscore 5.
87 On subscore 4 cluster 3 scored the same as cluster 1. On subscore 5 cluster 3 scored
slightly above cluster 1.




Looking at just the top and bottom groups, low performing clus-
ter 1 and high scoring cluster 4, the data are consistent with either a
single intelligence hypothesis or the view that these students happen
to demonstrate high or low achievement across two or more intelli-
gences or competencies. For about half the group, students who did
poorly in simulation continued to perform poorly on the exam89 and
students who did well on the simulations continued to do well on the
exam.
The 294 students in the two middle groups, however, paint a
more interesting picture. Cluster 3, higher simulation/low exam, per-
formed second best on the simulations. They scored not as highly as
the high scoring cluster 2, but slightly better than cluster 4, lower sim-
ulation/high exam. But clusters 3 and 4 crossed paths on the examina-
tion. Cluster 3, higher simulation/low exam, nosedived down to
cluster 1 on subscore 4, and edged up just a bit to come out above
cluster 2 on subscore 5, but just barely. Cluster 4, lower simulation/
-high exam, which scored just below cluster 3 on the simulations, then
vaulted into first place, above high performing cluster 2 on subscore 4
and came to rest with high achieving cluster 2 on subscore 5.
These students in clusters 3 and 4 combined performances, and
apparently their abilities, in differing ways. The 184 students in clus-
ter 3, higher simulation/low exam ranked second in overall perform-
ance on the simulations, with scores significantly lower than cluster 290
(the high performers) and a small interval higher than cluster 4. On
the exam, however, group 3's performance plummeted, while group
89 The whole group is relatively high achieving, given Fordham Law School's rigorous
admissions requirements. Virtually all of these students will go on to graduate from the
law school, pass the bar exam and most will practice law. My own experience suggests to
me that this bottom group is composed of a combination of two groups of students. Some
simply pay little or no attention to the class. They may ignore the assigned materials, skip
class or otherwise simply not engage in some or all of the class activities. These students
may lack motivation generally, think little of the particular course or have some particular
personal situation demanding their attention that semester. Some of the differences
among the groups is a reflection of how much work the individuals choose to do, rather
than an indication of their abilities. Some more able students perform better with less
preparation. Another portion of the low performing group seems to lack ability. They
may not understand the assigned material, although they appear to have read it, they may
offer muddled analysis in both the simulation and critique or they may be able to discuss
concepts but display little ability to execute a particular task in conformity with what they
have read or said. Although this footnote treats ability and motivation as distinct, Gardner
makes the argument that motivation is part of the intrapersonal intelligence and the expla-
nation for a given student's performance is likely to be quite complex.
90 The average scores on the simulations and general participation ranged from 19.1,
out of 20, for the high performing group 2 to 17.5 for the lowest performing, group 1, a
range of 1.6. Group 3 had an average score of 18.6, while group 4 had an average of 18.35.




4's skyrocketed. 91 Group 3's performance was quite close to group 1,
the low performers, while group 4 surpassed group 2, the high per-
formers, on subscore 4 and about equaled group 2 on subscore 5.
For these students, whose performance fell into the middle range
on the simulations, slightly weaker simulation performance was asso-
ciated with much stronger exam performance, while slightly stronger
simulation performance was followed by much weaker exam perform-
ance. In these groups the two different subparts, simulation and
exam, reached different skills or abilities. The group that had the sec-
ond strongest simulation skills demonstrated exam skills about equal
to the lowest performers overall.
The cluster analysis suggests a more subtle view of the indepen-
dent intelligences hypothesis. Cluster 3, the higher simulation/low
exam group, appears to be composed of students who have strong per-
sonal intelligences, somewhat strong oral linguistic and logical skills.
On this view, these students have many abilities. They may simply
have less well developed written linguistic aptitude, which may be no
more than a fancy way of saying they are poor test takers, although it
does help to suggest some of the limits of written exams. The lower
simulation/high exam group, cluster 4, might also be simply viewed as
comprised of students with particularly strong written linguistic skills
and somewhat less developed interpersonal intelligences. Taking all
four groups together, however, the picture appears a bit more
complicated.
Although a few students combined high exam and simulation
scores at the bottom of the group, that combination is rare enough so
that the best cluster fit found no group with that profile. There is, of
course, a significant group of high simulation and low exam scores,
cluster 3. Although the correlation analysis showed a relationship be-
tween exam scores and simulation performance, cluster analysis
makes the relationship quite graphic. Some students who perform
well on simulations will not write strong exams, but it is rare to find a
student who wrote a good exam who did not also do well on the
simulations.
V. EXPLAINING THE CLUSTERS USING MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES
At least two explanations fit this data. Exam writing may be
identified as a higher order skill which always includes the lesser skills
required in the simulations. This conception is a variation on the sin-
91 Group 4 went from an average score .2 lower than group 3 on subscore 3, the negoti-
ation simulation, to an average score 1 full point higher than group 4 on subscore 4, the
counseling exam question. On subscore 5, the negotiation exam question, the groups
moved closer again, but group 4 remained .5 above group 3.
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gle intelligence theory. Any student who can write a high scoring
exam will always have whatever abilities are required to do well in
simulation. The simulation abilities, however, are "lower order" in
the sense that they do not include all the exam skills, while the exam
skills do include all the simulation skills. This idea explains the data,
but only by labeling it. A more significant problem with this view is
that it does not capture an important reality of legal practice. Lawyers
who did not write good exams can be very successful in practice and
those who write wonderful exams do not always succeed. Although
one could argue that law school rewards some truer measure of ability
than does practice, a better explanation would account for the social
reality in a theoretically satisfying way.
The combinations of performances suggest that cluster 3, higher
simulation and lower exam and cluster 4, lower simulation and higher
exam, contain students with strengths in the personal intelligences and
oral linguistic intelligence or logical mathematical and written linguis-
tic intelligences, respectively. The first group, as I will argue more
fully below, does well on the simulation by virtue of a strong perform-
ance in the interpersonal dimensions of the simulation. These stu-
dents, however, do not write strong exams. The second group may
not be as strong in the interpersonal dimension, but their logical math-
ematical strength is also displayed in the simulation and they go on to
write strong exams. These two middle groups are made of identifiable
types of lawyers and law students, the vast middle ground of lawyers,
who have strong aptitudes for some lawyering tasks, but not all law-
yering tasks.
Although I am arguing that exam writing does not capture some
single, superordinate skill, the results suggest that doctrinal analysis,
or logical mathematical reasoning, is quite important in both the simu-
lation and exam settings. Before describing how the data fits the mul-
tiple intelligences model, I offer some description of the particular
tasks the students undertook, in order to better understand the role of
mathematical logical reasoning in the course. The simulation
problems in this course have a doctrinal element; they all require stu-
dents to understand and analyze some set of legal rules or principles
and contain some information on the relevant law. One of the
problems involves the legal issue of choosing among business forms -
should the entity be a partnership, corporation or organized in some
other way. The problem is designed so that the law is clear and broad
enough to permit the client to choose among a range of options de-
pending on non-legal factors, but the students must analyze the issue
to reach that conclusion. Another problem involves the division of
marital assets in a separation agreement. The students, in my judge-
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ment, need to understand the default rules in the area before they
counsel or negotiate about these matters. Although we do not explic-
itly grade on whether or not the students get the right answer to the
legal problem, it is very difficult for students to do a good job in any
dimension of the simulation if they cannot analyze the law. It does
not matter whether the weakness in the logical mathematical portion
of the problem stems from their lack of ability, or more typically given
my students' backgrounds, because they have not taken the time to
understand the relevant law. Although I have had students to whom I
have given strong grades in simulations in which they did not say a
single sensible thing about the substantive law, it is a very rare event.
Receiving a high grade on the simulations typically requires a rela-
tively high degree of mathematical logical reasoning.
I offer two reasons for this practical centrality of mathematical
logical reasoning, the second of which is more an admission than an
explanation. First, most of the work lawyers do is at least framed by,
if not centrally concerned with, the law as doctrine. Even as we may
creatively seek non-legal solutions to our clients problems, we do so in
the shadow of whatever legal event or threat brought them to a law-
yer. Although this is not the place to argue such a broad proposition,
it is my strongly held view that lawyering is centrally about, or in-
formed by, understanding the law as a logical, abstract system and
making predictions about how others will analyze it.
Even if you are unconvinced that logical mathematical reasoning
has a particularly central place in lawyerly thought, this course was
designed and taught by someone who does hold that view. As law-
yering is taught in many law schools, it tends to value logical mathe-
matical reasoning. Perhaps clinicians value that intelligence less
singularly than the rest of the institution, but many of us still place a
high value on it. Whether it is because legal problems really have
some deep logical structure or because we pretend they do in law
school, students who have great strength in that area, and not others,
may do as well or better in (even) a lawyering course, than those who
great strength in personal intelligence is not matched in other areas.
Just as each simulated problem has a doctrinal element, each
problem also presents issues that test a student's personal intelli-
gences. The simulated client typically has some emotional issue re-
lated to the legal situation, such as making business decisions in the
context of a family business or asset valuation in a marital setting.
The client's goals and motivations are typically hinted at in the written
materials and good preparation and execution will account for and
explore those issues.
In this course, the students' lawyering must contend with doctrine
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best addressed by logical mathematical intelligence and with dynamic
interactions between lawyer and client, best addressed by the personal
intelligences. The strongest students have both abilities and do well
on both the simulation and exam. The weakest students either do not
possess or use either set of intelligences. In the middle are clusters 3
and 4.
Cluster 3 are the higher simulation/lower exam students. These
students do quite well in the simulations, scoring above two other
groups, but their exam performance plummets. My sense is that these
students show strengths in their simulations consistent with strong
personal intelligences; they listen well, ask good follow-up questions,
develop a good understanding of the client's goals and situation and
help the client make reasonable decisions. In their critiques, they are
perceptive and insightful about their own behaviors and the dynamic
between them and their clients or adversaries. Unfortunately, this
group's personal intelligences are not matched by their written linguis-
tic or mathematical logical aptitudes and they perform quite poorly on
the exam.
Cluster 4, the lower simulation/higher exam group has the oppo-
site strengths and weaknesses. Their simulation performance is not
quite as strong as cluster 3. They are students who may not always
listen well, develop the full story or deeply understand their client's
goals, but their mathematical logical intelligence enables them to give
good and sometimes creative legal advice and to talk about their per-
formance and the legal context with insight during their critique. Al-
though their oral linguistic skills may not be quite a strong, their
aptitude for written linguistic expression, along with their mathemati-
cal logical skill makes them strong exam takers.
The slightly lower performance of cluster 4 on the simulations is
consistent with this picture - their 20 or 40 minute sessions do not have
the elegance and flow of their colleagues with greater personal intelli-
gence, but they score points with their instructors by giving sound le-
gal advice and offering logical analysis of their performances during
their critiques. In comparison, the strong personal intelligences of
cluster 3 students shine more in the simulations. They earn higher
evaluations than their more abstract reasoning peers, but not as strong
as those awarded to the top group, which combines all these talents.
VI. GENDER AND RACE
The data were also analyzed to determine if gender, race or year
in school was a significant factor in student performance. Overall,
women tended to do better in the course. Troublingly, students of
color were over-represented in the lowest performing cluster of stu-
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dents. Second year students tended to do better than third year stu-
dents on the exam, but not on the simulations.
Women received scores about .13 higher than. men for general
participation, the negotiation simulation 92 and the counseling exam
question.93 Women's scores were also slightly higher on both other
subscores, the counseling simulation and the negotiation exam ques-
tion, but those two results was not statistically significant. 94 Women
were also over represented in clusters 2 and 3, the strong exam taking
groups, but not to a statistically significant degree.95 Given that na-
tional statistics show that women law students have slightly lower
overall grades than their male counterparts,96 their stronger perform-
ance in this class, relative to their male classmates, may be due to
pedagogy, the course material or some other factor particular to this
class.
Although the correlation analysis is consistent with the general
perception that the course material is gendered, particularly in its em-
phasis on the interpersonal dynamics and ethical aspects of lawyering,
the cluster analysis again paints a more complex picture. An essen-
tialist view of gender would suggest that woman would excel in the
personal intelligences, yet women are over-represented in the two
92 For a discussion of the role of gender in negotiation simulations, see Farber & Rick-
enberg, supra note 37 (finding that women and men achieved similar outcomes but women
tended to make harsher judgments about their own abilities than did men, particularly
when less favorable outcomes were achieved in the course of the simulation and that con-
textual factors in the simulation, such as which party the student represented, mattered
more to the female students' perceptions of success than to the male students' evaluations
of their success in the exercise.)
93 The actual mean scores on these three subscores were between .12 and .14 (p < .05)
higher.
94 The actual mean scores for the counseling simulation and negotiation exam ques-
tions were .07 higher but not statistically significant.
95 Women made up 48% of the total sample and 54% of clusters 2 and 4, while they
made up 41% of cluster 1 and 43% of cluster 3.
96 Linda Wrightman, Women in Legal Education: A Comparison of the Law School
Performance and Law School Experiences of Women and Men, Law School Admissions
Council Research Report Series, 1996 (reporting national data showing women have
slightly lower first year grades); Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine, & Jane Balin, with Ann Bar-
tow & Deborah Lee Stachel, Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy
League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 21 (1994)(reporting their study showing women
students at University of Pennsylvania Law School had lower grades throughout law
school.); Sarah Berger, Angela Olivia Burton, Peggy Cooper Davis, Elizabeth Ehrenfest
Steinglass & Robert Levy, "Hey! There's Ladies Here!!" 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1022
(1998)(reviewing Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine & Jane Balin with Ann Bartow & Deborah
Lee Stachel, Becoming Gentlemen: Women, Law School, and Institutional Change; Linda F.
Wightman, Women in Legal Education: A Comparison of the Law School Performance and
Law School Experiences of Women and Men; Elizabeth Mertz with Wamucii Njogu & Su-
san Gooding, What Difference Does Difference Make?: The Challenge for Legal Education;




groups that show strength in the exam and the group that ranked third
in simulations, as well as first in simulations. Surprisingly to that sim-
ple essentialist view, men predominate in the cluster that did well
through their strength in simulation and presumably the personal
intelligences.
Although this data only reveals some gross patterns, I suspect
that several factors worked together to create this pattern. The simu-
lations by women, as a group, may not have been evaluated quite as
highly as those by men because the instructors97 may have held the
women to a higher standard. Perhaps we think women should be bet-
ter at these skills and are pleasantly surprised if a man shows any facil-
ity for it at all. The difference may also reflect a greater willingness on
the part of the men to be the center of attention and talk about them-
selves. A third factor may be the need for women to work harder at
developing strong written skills so that they will test better and pre-
sent stronger "objective" credentials to overcome biases they encoun-
ter earlier in their educational experiences. The picture is not clear
and the results are not strong, but it appears that women do better in
the blind graded exam than in the face to face evaluation of the simu-
lation. This raises the troubling possibility that even a group of law
school teachers, making a conscious effort to address issues of diver-
sity, still act on unconscious and outdated ideas about who can and
should be a lawyer.
Unfortunately, race continues to be a factor in law school grading
overall, 98 and in this class. White students received scores between .2
and .27 higher than students of color on four of the five subscores. 99
There was no difference on the negotiation simulation. 100 Students of
color made up 26% of the overall sample,' 0 ' and were under repre-
sented in the high scoring cluster, comprising 15% of that group and
over represented in the low scoring cluster accounting for 43% of that
group.102 This result is consistent with overall grading patterns at this
97 The small group instructors were about evenly divided along gender lines, although
the numbers varied from semester to semester. Given that there were never more than 8
of us, individual differences likely predominated over average group attitudes.
98 Ogloff, Lyon, Douglas & Rose, supra note 1 (study showing that minority graduates
of Michigan Law School had lower GPAs of about 0.9%, but satisfaction with law school
and career success similar to white graduates).
99 The difference was between .2 and .27 (p < .001), or between 1 and 1.4% of the total
20 point scale.
100 Perhaps the life experiences of students of color have given them more experience
with negotiation and they are better at it than their classmates. Regression analysis would
be required to begin to tease out the reasons for this difference. The negotiation grades
were also higher overall and fell in a narrower range, see supra note 57, which made them
less useful for distinguishing among performances than the counseling simulation grades.
101 Data on race was missing for about 20% of the sample.
102 p < 001.
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and other law schools.
These troubling statistics have a number of causes. The differ-
ence flows all too naturally from the gross inequalities that character-
ize American education generally. At this, and other law schools
across America, students of color come disproportionately from pri-
mary, secondary and undergraduate schools that struggle with fewer
resources and greater challenges than the elite schools that many
white students attend. Those problems, compounded by the biases in
the LSAT, are reflected in lower test scores coming into law school.
The hierarchy is then reaffirmed by the rigid ranking at the end of the
first year of law school. As the grip of first year grades is unlikely to
be relaxed, remedial efforts must be early and significant enough to
address first year performance.
Systemic problems do not end with enrollment in law school.
Once students of color become law students, they must contend with
largely white institutions and the residue of usually, but not always,
unconscious attitudes about who should and should not be a success-
ful law student or lawyer. The results of this study suggest those
problems pose a very real challenge for classes which use subjective,
non-blind grading. Even as we tried to assess a broader range of skills
and give every student an opportunity to better display his or her par-
ticular talents, it seems all too likely that we recycled our own biases
about the profession, to the detriment of women 10 3 and students of
color. Educating the teachers about their own biases is one place to
begin. Better defined grading guidelines for the simulations would
also be useful, although care must be used to value diversity in those
standards. This concern also further heightens the need for more di-
versity in faculty. Students might be evaluated by different faculty
during the semester, although the gain in differing perspectives might
be offset by the damage that would do to the development of student -
faculty relationships.
These remain vexing problems. One part of the solution lies in
continued efforts to nurture greater representation of people of color
in the professions, including targeted academic support for students
from less privileged backgrounds. The larger problem is the subject of
much ongoing study and is much beyond the scope of this paper, but it
is worth noting that multiple intelligences theory is just one part of a
larger intellectual movement to understand and explain the funda-
mental value of diversity and pluralism in our society. Yet even as we
recognize the larger problem, it is also important to recognize the
foreground - the attitudes of even well intentioned law teachers. Un-
103 See supra at 935-36.
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conscious biases may only be discoverable through careful analysis of
our deeds, rather than projection of our hopes.
The available data did not permit analysis of the intersection of
gender and race, nor was it possible to analyze the performances of
different subgroups among students of color. The analysis of gender
does not distinguish by race, and the analysis of race does not account
for gender. It seems likely that the challenges for women of color are
more complex than for white women. There are also likely to be dis-
tinct issues among different groups of students of color. Another fac-
tor unaccounted for in this study is class. 10 4 This paper does not
attempt to add to the rich discussion about the intersection of race,
gender and class in American society. Analysis of the impact of each
category on law school performance is an important project, and even
the simple treatment of these issues in this paper leaves little doubt
that these are significant and troubling issues.
VII. YEAR IN SCHOOL
Analysis of the data by class year and division membership (day
and evening division students) showed that second year day students
performed better on the exam, but not on the simulations. 10 5 The sec-
ond year day students bested their third year counterparts on subscore
4, the counseling exam question, but not subscore 5, the negotiation
question. The second year day students performed better on both
exam questions than the evening students. The second year students
may be more motivated than their graduating third year counterparts
or their evening division colleagues, who are a mix of second, third
and fourth year students. The evening students' performance may
also reflect their busier schedules, as many of them have full time em-
ployment. The evening students, as a group, also have lower indica-
tors coming into law school. Although it might seem that these same
factors would have some effect on the simulation scores, it might be
that time and motivation are not as significant earlier in the semester
or these results may just be a further reflection of the independence of
104 For evidence that socioeconomic factors are a key piece of this puzzle, see Kidder,
supra note 3, at 183-84 (arguing that much of the over prediction of minority academic
success by the LSAT is best explained by economic factors). Anecdotal experience at
Fordham, traditionally a gateway school for upwardly professionally mobile students from
lower class families, suggests that race is, in part, a surrogate for the challenges facing all
students at very selective law schools who had fewer opportunities and attended less com-
petitive colleges.
105 Second year students performed significantly better than third year students on sub-
score 4 (p <.001), but not subscore 5. Second year students performed significantly better
than evening division students on both subscores 4 and 5. (p <.005). There were no signifi-





This paper suggests that there is significant degree of indepen-
dence among the various skills law students need to develop to be-
come successful lawyers. Although some people show strengths
across the full range of skills, many law students show more promise
in some areas than in others. Law schools should help students under-
stand their own strengths and how they can match their own profiles
to the wide range of opportunities presented by the law. Specializa-
tion and role differentiation is the reality of much of legal practice, yet
law school pedagogy, particularly law school evaluation practices, re-
flect the aspiration to produce just one kind of lawyer,10 6 all of whom
are measured on a single scale. We must develop a more nuanced
understanding of the legal profession and a more sophisticated ap-
proach to educating our students about the variety of lawyerly roles
and how they should choose among opportunities.
One important step toward helping law students navigate our
complex profession is providing more varied evaluation formats. The
over-reliance on exams fails to identify the group of students whose
simulation performance provides evidence of their indication of prob-
able success in many lawyer roles. We now give most students very
clear, early information about their weaknesses. For most law stu-
dents, much of the end of first year and the beginning of second year
is taken up with learning how for far they are from the top of the class
and what that means about their prospects for the highest paying jobs
and other high status positions. We might also try to tell our students
about some the things they are good at doing and, perhaps more revo-
lutionary, we might begin to really value those talents.
If, for example, we accept that the personal intelligences are re-
ally independent, valuable abilities in the world, we might begin to
prize skillful client counseling more than we do. If we coupled that
awareness with an effort to identify our students aptitudes in the per-
sonal intelligences, we could help students develop a professional role
around their strengths. Students with those strengths might more
often see direct client service as an important and challenging career,
106 Defining what kind of lawyer that would be presents an interesting problem, requir-
ing study of law school curricula and culture. Most law schools, and particularly elite
schools, aspire to train judges and policy makers. In fact they turn out many transactional
lawyers and civil litigators. There are also a number of schools that have defined their
missions in other ways, whether because they mean to serve students with particular goals
or because they serve a locality and teach to the local general practitioner. The clinical
legal education movement has moved legal education toward more contextualized, role
specific education in which one challenge is to balance the specific and the general.
Fall 20011
286 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:247
rather than a path for those who did not get jobs at the biggest law
firms. They could make better informed decisions about whether or
not to work to improve in some areas and how to plan and prepare for
their particular careers as lawyers. Students with traditionally recog-
nized strengths might also be a little more humble and learn that writ-
ing high scoring exams is one valuable aptitude among a constellation
of abilities. We do our students, and the profession, a disservice by
graduating many students who feel unrecognized, and were in fact not
educated as well as they could have been, by their law schools.
